Peace Talks in Afghanistan: Before starting negotiation

Winter in Kabul is at its peak, but political arena particularly for peace talks starts to warm. After about six months delay, actors (Afghanistan, Pakistan, the U.S. and China) agreed to resume peace talks. Meanwhile, largely considered monolithic group, Taliban has been reportedly split following the announcement of Mullah Omar’s death; however, they intensified attacks throughout Afghanistan. This piece attempts to explore some possible challenges for nascent Peace Talks.

The very word and notion of peace has been misused for almost 10 years. At the beginning ‘war for peace’ was the prevailing feature of the conflict and later on it made to election campaign and peace became the most outspoken notion among the runners for presidency. Although countrywide surveys showed that peace was the first demand of Afghans, it rarely made top priority list of the belligerents and attracted symbolic attention. 

Immediately after the collapse of the Taliban regime, there was a great chance of reconciliation even some were willing to stay and live peacefully if their security and survival were guaranteed. But international forces opposed such compromise and regarded it violation of their definition of terrorism. The Afghan government also did not insist, bearing in mind the political culture of the country, the winners either unlikely to compromise or want lion’s share.

International forces soften their stance vis-à-vis the armed opponents of the government (the Taliban and Islamic party of Gulbadin Hikmatyar) when the later proved to pose a serious threat for them.  Former president Hamid Karzai established peace council to reach out to the Taliban. But this time, Taliban considering themselves winners, did not even want to negotiate until international forces fully withdraw.

After about 10-year war and casualties, it was proved that war is not an ultimate means to bring peace and stability, but negotiations are. Although political will of all actors were mattered, Taliban opened a political office in Doha of Qatar. It did not yield desired outcome except the prisoners swap between the United States of America and Taliban.

Now once again peace talks has been heating up. On the eve of talks, some points need to be addressed before starting negotiations:

The word peace per se is open to question when we contextualize and relate it to Afghanistan. Therefore, terminology matters; terrorism, peace, national interests, reconcilable groups and the type of government are some terms that have either not been clearly defined or have been strictly defined by one party/group. One among other shortcomings of the previous peace attempts was lack of a clear definition of reconciliation. The form, which was made compulsory to be signed by anyone who wanted to reconcile, seemed more like a formal surrender letter. Reconciliation and surrender are two different terms with separate meanings and connotations.

The National Unity Government (NUG) so far has improved relation with foreign countries. Confidence between President Ashraf Ghani and the United States seems much better than of Karzai, however, speculations are mounting regarding the United States’ intention and will.   ‘International forces fights for their own interests’ is a broad and vague issue. Even ex-president said ‘after 13 years as a president, I still don’t know what the U.S.A. really wants here’. Pakistan, the most vital player in peace talks and negotiations, has been propagating that ‘peace in Afghanistan is peace in Pakistan’. Ex-president of Pakistan Pervez Musharraf’s speeches of today and that of during his tenure are contradicted. Carlotta Gall, the author of the wrong enemy, concluded that ‘Pakistan’s action tells a different story.’

Freedom of direct involved players is prerequisite for any pact, particularly in this landmark deal. Keeping it blurred could endanger the whole process anytime. Although actors and groups claim to be fully independent, this claim either needs be proved or a certain degree of leverage of the other ought to be nodded. Though this scenario seems hypothetical or almost impossible, it could help understand the root causes which leads to successful conflict resolution.

Disintegrating groups, at least for the time being, may not benefit anyone. Having in mind that belligerents groups are subject to manipulation, ‘divide and rule’ approach is highly likely to have counterproductive results. Directly involved actors such as the Taliban, Hizb-e-Islami (Islamic party of Gulbaddin Hikmatyar) and somehow as Afghan government reportedly have been split. After the demise of Mullah Omar, Mullah Akhtar Mansoor declared himself successor but was opposed by among other Mohammad Rasool Akhund. Infighting allegedly erupted in Zabul and Herat provinces. It seems a reportedly reconciliatory attempt in Quetta of Pakistan did not mend the rift. Taliban did not unanimously speak of peace talks while Mullah Omar was supposedly alive. There were various accounts of a dubbed ‘Muree peace talks’ that were held between Afghan government, the Taliban, Pakistan, U.S.A and China in July 2015 in 60 km of Islamabad, Pakistan. NUG argues that they have full authority of brokering peace deal. Constitutionally speaking, he does. However, parliament, newly established (protection & stability) council, civil societies, tribal and religious leader have played leading role in Afghan politics.

Exclusion of active players may prolong the conflict as it did after the Bonn conference in late 2001. Both the Taliban and Islamic party were excluded. Later on a UN envoy to Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi, termed that exclusion ‘the original sin’. No directly involved actor should be marginalized and excluded. Although here are other groups that threaten regional stability, their vision and goals are more global, so they are considered not to be part of this negotiation.

Lastly, actions matter not the words and statements. Fights have been intensified throughout Afghanistan. It is impossible to stop it overnight, but once negotiations start, the intensity should be gradually decreased. Besides that, delisting of Taliban from UN sanction list should immediately follow the deliberate decline in attacks.  It could be used for trust building and sincerity.

Ghani takes risk, but clock is ticking for Pakistan too

National Unity Government (NUG) had promised to bring peace and stability during their election campaigns. For this end, Ashraf Ghani remarkably changed his foreign policy vis-à-vis Pakistan, which has been considered the key for what NUG had pledged to fulfill. This paradigm change has been severely criticized inside Afghanistan. Critics argue that Ghani has been offering more while receiving nothing or very little. We discuss that the rapprochement, bearing in mind the key role and dependency on Pakistan, is an attempt to balance relations between two rivals (Pakistan and India) rather than asymmetric concessions.

Afghanistan and Pakistan relation have been drastically improved since Ashraf Ghani took office on 29^th of September 2014. Visits of high ranking officials of the two countries including President Ashraf Ghani, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, chiefs of army staffs Raheel Sharif of Pakistan and Sher Mohammad Karimi of Afghanistan and heads of Inter Service Intelligences Rizwan Akhter have been increased. Afghanistan for the very first time sent army cadets to be trained at the Pakistan Military Academy in Abbottabad and this was something Pakistan has been reportedly eying to achieve since the Taliban has been ousted.

 A much hyped intelligence sharing memorandum of understanding (MoU) has been allegedly signed between Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) and National Directorate of Security (NDS) though it has not been officially confirmed yet. Although the MoU has not been made publicly available yet, leaked reports suggest that, besides sharing intelligence information about terrorism, it will bind AfPak to conduct coordinated cross-border military operations against insurgency and ‘separatists’. AfPak relations were greatly suffering lack of trust and neither side was believing in what the other was stating publicly. To cripple suspicion and build trust, a bold initiative seems prerequisite.

In response, so far Pakistan army has stopped mortar shelling of Kunar province of Afghanistan which took tens of civilians’ lives in the past. The army had been claiming of targeting Tahrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) who they thought were hiding there, but this claim has been repeatedly rejected by Afghan government. Mortar shelling was one of tense issues between Pakistan and Hamid Karzai government, which had in turns deteriorated relations. Besides that, Pakistan national security adviser Sartaj Aziz recently stated that they have facilitated Taliban and Afghan government envoys meeting in Uromqi of Xinjiang province of China though Taliban rejected and called those who were representing Taliban ‘unauthorized’ ones. Aziz further said that the two will have another meeting in a week and it has also been said that ‘good news’ about peace is due in three months. Furthermore, Pakistan has publically made it clear that ‘enemies of Afghanistan are enemies of Pakistan’. Since action matters more than sheer words, Afghan government should seek a more solid reciprocation.

Although AfPak relations have been improving, security situation is deteriorating in Afghanistan. Causalities of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have increased. Two districts in Kunduz and another one in Kunar have fallen to Taliban. Hike in instability seems to be more seasonal bearing in mind the fighting season, but this year the scale of insurgency is unmatchable.  The intensity in attacks may have reason and it is; strike with full strength which could lead you to gain more and dominate if peace talks are to be negotiated. 

Afghan president is also under fire inside Afghanistan for marginalizing India. Criticism come mostly from the predecessor and of those who had antagonistic relations with Pakistan during the past two decades.  Hamid Karzai’s government had friendly relations with India. They signed Strategic Partnership Agreement[1], which stipulates India to train and equip Afghan army. Republic of India has spent more than $ 2.5 billion in re/construction of Afghanistan. Ashraf Ghani, considering Pakistan’s sensitivity, relatively goes cautiously with India. 

The most serious issue for Pakistan, what I learnt during my research on AfPak among other (the Durand Line, Baluch ‘separatists’, Tahrik-Taliban Pakistan, water management and Afghan refugee) was the growing involvement and visibility of India, “Pakistan takes the issues of ‘Indianization’[2] of Afghanistan very seriously”. Parvez Musharaf, ex-president and Chief of Army Staff of Pakistan, once warned countermeasure if India keeps further domination in Afghanistan. Afghanistan as a sovereign state has legitimate right to establish relations with any country that suits her interests the best. Nevertheless, to expect tangible outcome from Pakistan, it is not free of cost. However, Ashraf Ghani paid an official visit to India where he stated in remarks to business community “we want to assure you that if you invest in Afghanistan, nobody is going to shake you down”. Furthermore, Prime Minister Narenda Modi promised to support open and functional Chabahar port of Iran, which gives Afghanistan sea access. In the recent development, Ashraf Ghani told in an interview that ‘more agreements are to be inked with in three months’. (I need to use exact words and cite a source for this).

Ashraf Ghani by taking paradigm shift in foreign policy vis-à-vis Pakistan has taken risk. The risk is more domestic than at international arena. A more severe backlash may erupt against overall rapprochement of Ghani and particularly against the MoU, which has already been named by the critics who have not been made part of the NUG in malicious term i.e. ‘infamous’, ‘notorious’, sinful’ and ‘selling out of Afghanistan’ if the conciliation does not yield an expected outcome.

This time-bounded rapprochement is seemingly neither totally one-sided nor it is asymmetric concession, but it could be interpreted as an attempt to mend and balance relation between the two all-time rivals in pursuit of stabilization of Afghanistan.  Presumably the national unity government pays higher cost, but clock is ticking for Pakistan and it has more at stake. This seems to be the last chance for Pakistan to befriend Afghanistan.

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[1] www.mofa.gov.....

[2] This term is deliberately used in Pakistan to show their anger about the growing visibility of India in Afghanistan.

The recent developments in AfPak relations: excitement and worries

Political changes in leadership and power transition in both Afghanistan and Pakistan have given hopes but also has raised criticism particularly in Afghanistan. In almost 67-year history of Pakistan, an elected president completed his first tenure and democratically handed over authority  to another elected one. The same did happen in Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani replaced Hamid Karzai. After the two governments have started working, Afghanistan and Pakistan (AfPak) relations have been passing through more tangible changes, this time seemingly in a ‘positive’ direction. However, the question whether this rapprochement is seasonal or will yield desired outcomes - though too early - remains blurred.

‘Change’ in AfPak relations was deemed necessary. The then status-qua was criticized and of course having ‘good relations’ – through very broad term- can better suit AfPak interests. However, asymmetric concessions are time-bound and won’t prove productive in the long run. Unless proper and immediate reciprocal measures take place, it may have counterproductive reactions mainly because of frustrations and lack of sincerity. President Ghani may come under extreme pressure from within and he may resort to pursue his predecessor's policy or even harsher than that. 

Afghan cadets, for the first time, went to Pakistan for training. Afghan government has launched military operation in eastern Afghanistan, where the existence of TTP is allegedly believed. Besides that, drone strikes have been increased particularly in Kunar province of Afghanistan. As the Guardian noticed, Ashraf Ghani has reportedly suspended a deal where India was providing weapons for Afghan army and any high level officials have yet to visit India since the inauguration of new leadership in Afghanistan. These are Pakistan’s demands which were marginalized and ignored in Karzai government but the new government is meeting them more enthusiastically.

Although high level relations and interactions have been increased and improved with the advent of the new government in Afghanistan, the ground realities particularly in border regions remain intact and even worsen, a witness who is familiar with the issue told me “the armed opponent of Afghan government receive better financial supports and they nowadays buy cars, which they were just dreaming of it.” Following the Zar-e-Azab military operation in Waziristan, insurgency spikes in Afghanistan, Wall Street Journal noticed. The question ‘whether it is the spillover effect or strategic move’ may have multidimensional answers. In a recent crackdown of refugees in Pakistan, about 30,000 Afghans have been deported according to Tolo News report.

The terms ‘paradigm shift’ and ‘game changer’ have been repeatedly heard recently in media. But even in ultra-optimistic analysis too, ‘mentality’ takes time to be ‘shifted’ or ‘changed’. It does not happen overnight. Everyone who smokes knows the disadvantages of smoking and reads ‘it causes cancer’ but they keep smoking.

After all, the word ‘Pakistan’ should not be translated literally in terms of representation. So far, it represents the army and its intelligence wing when it comes to foreign policy and security of Pakistan.

Cost and benefit analysis must have been measuring the current trends of AfPak in both countries and region. There is ‘no free lunch’ when it comes to politics and international relations, but in this case ‘quid pro quo’ approach has not been used, at least so far.

It is too early to judge, as some are harshly criticizing while others are more optimistic, the possible outcome. However, a state-to-state channel of communication and interactions is considered a rational development. A state-to-party, ethnicity and individual actor channels, which were the main stream of communication in the past, seem to be fading away.

National Unity Government and its road ahead

The first peaceful power transition (or power-sharing deal) in the history of Afghanistan took more than six months. The deal was welcomed globally, but had mix reaction inside Afghanistan. White House, NATO, UK, and Pakistan assure to continue their cooperation with newly formed government of Afghanistan. Some residents of Kabul took to street to celebrate the announcement of Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan (IEC)– Ashraf Ghani as a president and Abdullah Abdullah as a CEO. However, a professor at Herat University says, “I am not optimistic”.

The National Unity Government (NUG) may have a hard and tricky path ahead at least domestically. The now team-workers once had different approaches to various issues including the Taliban. Ashraf Ghani argued that the Taliban should be incorporated through a holistic plan of reconciliation, while Abdullah Abdullah said, “I think they [the Taliban] think, the government [of Afghanistan] should be ousted”. Having contradicted views on specific and vital issue may adversely affect the overall performance of the NUG.

New cabinet and other important posts are going to be filled though with some Tug of War. Nepotism matters at least in Afghan bureaucratic culture. Both Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah, for appeasing their campaigners, seem to be obliged to select from within own team. Such a heterogeneous working team per se maybe the first hurdle for NUG to tackle corruption and implement administrative reforms.

The six-month election impasse has faded the notion of democracy though others say it is the very nature of democracy. However, it is arguable if the stalemate and stubbornness have undermined the legitimacy of some institutions.  The Independent Election Commission is one of them. The commission’s members were accused of ‘systemic fraud’. During the elections, counting and auditing process, IEC mostly spoke after each deal was brokered. The commission’s job was to announce the winner and votes. But, instead, the head of commission Yousuf Nooristani just read a coded joint communiqué after it was agreed.  

It is widely expected that the new government will soon sign bilateral security agreement (BSA) with the United States. Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah had promised to sign if they win the election. Therefor, signing a BSA is just a matter of time. This might be the reason that John Kerry willingly came twice and made around thirty phone calls to strike the deal.

Afghanistan and Pakistan relations, at least at civil governments level, may go well than Karzai government. Ashraf Ghani as an ex-World Bank economist and Nawaz Sharif as a pro-business could develop good trade relations. Such individual-based relations may not put a quick end to decades-long tense relations, particularly when it comes to Durand Line and insurgencies.

Generally relations with immediate neighbors, and particularly, in Central Asia could go smoother. The selection of Abdul Rashid Dustam as a first vice-president was generally perceived and propagated to establish more functional relations with Turkmenistan. Abdullah as a Chief Executive can strengthen economic and political relations with Iran. A regional and important player, India is already a strategic partner of Afghanistan.

To conclude, we can argue that the NUG would work far better vis-à-vis neighbors, regional and international players than intra-Afghans players and stakeholders.

@hazratbahar

Finish before it finishes you

The dilemma:

Afghan elections, as once considered a landmark in the history of Afghanistan, turns into elections impasse. U.S.A had meticulously predicted today’s scenario – elections goes to second round, which will be marred by claims of fraud and the final announcement might take six months- when she was pushing president Hamid Karzai to sign bilateral security agreement. We are more than half done and desperately moving to bleak and gloomy future in the rest of two months, if the dilemma is going to be finished or it finishes us in exactly six months.

During the election impasse, we witnessed many breakings news saying: counting/auditing process stops and resumes. People weary of such narrative. We have been hearing many coded words and expressions from both runners, which are interpreted in different ways. It is hard for those who are part of neither side to understand where the Pandora box is. And both parties are not totally honest vis-à-vis Afghans, for whom the Two were begging to vote in each one’s favor. A very superficial understanding is they have yet to reach power-sharing deal, and issues like fraud and complaints are nothing but sheer pretexts.

The outgoing president urges both runners and IEC to wrap things up sooner as he is packing his stuff up and leaving the much demanded and desired – at least in Afghan politics – chair of Arg (Palace). People can’t decide to decorate their own homes because of election deadlock; “I am waiting for the election to be over before I decide to change the old and worn-out curtains of my house” a woman in Herat was quoted in AAN paper. However, the Two have speeded up the race and have been meeting on daily basis recently, but it has has yet to strike the deal. They are playing a very risky game.

The Price:

Afghanistan economic growth was falling far before elections and it was fairly inevitable. But the election deadlock has been drastically worsening the fading and fragile economy. Business is contracting. The distressing sentiment among national and international investors is quite visible. Local businessmen don’t import goods that may not be sold out within two weeks. This in turns hikes the essential commodities prices throughout the country.

Afghanistan is highly dependent on foreign aids. Donor countries and organizations have either stopped or halved their funding. A member of an international development organization operating in Khost said, “we have stopped all our field projects. We are waiting for elections and our developing budget will be released once a peaceful elections over.” Seemingly, the government is moving to bankruptcy. A recent announcement by finance minister saying they may cut salaries of the government employees if the tassel prolonged proves how stable our economy is. So far, the 2014 election costs the country $ 5 billion, which is one sixth of Afghanistan total GDP.

Having already 30-35% unemployment rate with almost halted hiring has further deteriorated the shrinking economy and the unemployed youths are prone to resort to counterproductive activities. The notion of ‘national interests’ from the Two is losing value.

The first ever Afghan-led regional cooperation process – the heart of Asia or Istanbul process – was delayed. Its fourth round was schedule to be held on 29th of August in China where the member countries’ foreign ministers would meet and discuss Afghanistan oriented issues.

The questions of legitimacy:

The euphoria of elections and post elections is turning into misery and people are losing trust in elections. In a country like Afghanistan, legitimacy of a deal initiated or advised by foreigners is always questionable. The so-called ‘national unity government’ (NUG) deal was brokered by secretary John Kerry. Highly likely the NUG will be interpreted into fragile and weak government, at least in the beginning. Thus, it is hard, if not impossible, for a weak government to demonstrate itself strong and solidified one on national and international arenas.

National unity government, if formed, has plenty of challenges ahead. Security and political stability are two of them. The armed opponent groups of the Afghan government may hardly resort to peace talks – the only mean to bring perpetual stability, if political environment stays as it is. More are at stake and the Two maybe held responsible for causing and prolonging the dilemma.

ASEAN: An emerging & regional player?

The great powers - U.S.A, emerging China - and others regional powers and countries see and assume the ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations - another emerging security and economic community. To have more political and economic leverage than each other in the region, both U.S.A and China try to have close relations with ASEAN. Generally speaking, as a new regional player ASEAN is the emerging power, but the intra-ASEAN problems and conflicts have significantly undermined and affected the overall potential of the ASEAN.  

After ASEAN initiated ARF – ASEAN Regional Forum - dominant courtiers and union like, U.S.A, China, E.U, India, Russia, and Japan joined it enthusiastically. Soon after joining ARF, aforementioned players appointed their ambassadors to ASEAN, which might show the importance of ASEAN. U.S.A. ambassador to ASEAN, Scot Marcial explained the importance the association “Southeast Asia is an indispensible partner for the United States in trying to deal with the global financial crisis, climate change, and range of other issues in the world.” “We are looking to the ASEAN to be a partner in a whole host of issues.”[1] Beside nominating Ambassador to ASEAN, United State signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in July 2009 and President Obama attended the first ASEAN-US summit in Singapore.

China changed their foreign policy toward ASEAN after 1990s, because of the fear that some other great powers, which China sees rival may have strong influence in the region. China boosted their economic ties and cooperation with ASEAN members to the extent that now ASEAN is the only trade member, where China has trade deficit. Southeast Asia is vital for China through which she exports almost 75% of goods to Middle East. ASEAN is equally important for Russia too. As Paradorn Rangsimaporn argued, Russia attached greater importance to relation with Asia, “Moscow sees ASEAN as ripe with opportunities for Russia to enhance its influence in Southeast Asia and across East Asia”[2]. Besides that, E.U, Japan, and India try to strengthen their relation and ties with ASEAN particularly in the recent past. To conclude, each great/regional/emerging player for keeping their influence tries to have better relations and strengthen ties with ASEAN.

In late 1990s and 21^st century, ASEAN has been expanded to 10 members and established sub-communities; ASC, AEC, and ASCC and drew a charter. Tellingly, we can say that they brought positive changes in their policy that in turns boost the importance of ASEAN, “A key element of this ASEAN strategy is the co-engagement of China, the U.S, Japan and India”[3]. ASEAN members do insist to enhance the idea of regionalism within to play vital and constructive role in solving and settling intra-ASEAN problems. “In the face of difficulty and challenge, regionalism is the only way. There is no alternative. This has been the insight and the decision of ASEAN leaders.”[4]

Though great and emerging powers view ASEAN as an important partner both in politics and economics, intra-ASEAN problems and conflicts may downplay the emerging influence of ASEAN. Though it seems naïve to compare ASEAN to European Community, but limited interactions – social, political, and cultural - among ASEAN adversely affect overall status of them. People feel more isolated and heterogeneous. Below figures of recent survey conducted in ASEAN countries show how they view each other. [5]

1	Similarity in	Agree	Disagree
2	Culture	64.4	32.6
3	Economy	39.7	60.3
4	Politics	34.9	65.1
5	Being as a ASEAN	76.8	23.3

Current problems among ASEAN members; a) Malaysia-Singapore: Land reclamation; territorial disputes; and water supply, b) Thai-Cambodia: Preah Vihear Temple; and Angkor Wat temple, c) Malaysia-Philippines: Territorial claims; insurgency; and illegal migration, d) Malaysia-Indonesia: Territorial claims; and illegal migrants in Malaysia, e) Malaysia-Thai: Separatist insurgency; illegal immigrants; illegal fishing; and territorial claims, and f) Myanmar-Thai: territorial disputes; and historical image of enemy make it difficult to cooperate each other in great platform. Pointing finger and blaming other is a part of Asian culture. Secretary general of ASEAN Rodolfo C. Severino argued that problems exist as a heritage of colonialism, “the colonial powers left unresolved, or had created, territorial, ethnic and economic issues that engendered an environment of dispute and suspicion between the new nations that emerged in Southeast Asia.”[6] But the question that what ASEAN has done to tackle these problems remained unanswered.

One possible reason might be the lack of a general consensus and concession or highly prioritization of domestic or national interest as Shaun Narine said, “countries cooperate in regional organization till the domestic priorities unchallenged.”[7] Secondly, adopting non-intervention policy or an unwillingness of ASEAN among members’ countries, as Amitav Acharya mentioned “indeed, adherence to non-intervention is said to have thwarted ASEAN’s ability to responds to the East Timor crisis and apply genuine pressure on Burma.”[8]

For settling and resolving intra-ASEAN conflicts, members’ countries have to develop policy where they boost cooperation, harmony and interactions in various aspects. Although ‘cooperation’ is being repeatedly mentioned in ASEAN summits till now far from in practice. Rodolfo Severino insists on regional solution and cooperation, “growing trans-national problems, notably those pertaining to the marine and atmospheric environment and cross-border crimes, are susceptible only of regional solutions, which means more intensive ASEAN cooperation in a broader range of areas” is required. He further argues that, “ASEAN is emerging as a true community or even family.”[9]

As an emerging power and heterogeneous society, ASEAN has yet to reach a real security community and dominate power. But arguably they are only a few steps away. As Mely Caballero-Anthony says “security and democracy are ‘complementary’ to changes being made in ASEAN.” The recent political and policy changes in Southeast Asia particularly in Myanmar and Indonesia, we can argue they are stepping toward democracy, which plays vital rule accordingly to Mely Caballero-Anthony “democratization in Southeast Asia allows new actors, both public and private to become involved in forging a regional identity.”[10] However, political unrest followed by military coup in Thailand may halt some aspects of democratization in the region.

To conclude as Shaun Narine mentioned, “Despite the [intra-ASEAN] problems, ASEAN has the greatest prospect for evolving in the twenty first century.”[11]

Bibliography

1.     Marcial, Scot, US policy toward ASEAN, Feb.26.2009 [www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2009/02/119967.htm] accessed date Feb.24.2012

2.     Myoe, Maung, SEA International relation, class lecture, IUJ, Mar.2012

3.     Rangsimaporn, Paradorn, Russia’s Search for Influence Southeast Asia, Asian Survey, (Vol. 49, Issue 5, pp. 786-808, 2009)

4.     Acharya, Amitav, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia, 2^nd edition, Routledge, New York, 2009

5.     Severino, C. Rodolfo, ASEAN faces the future, ASEAN Secretariat, 2001

6.     Thompson, C. Eric and Thianthai, Attitudes and Awareness toward ASEAN, ISEAS, Singapore, 2008.

7.     Shaun Narine. "ASEAN in the twenty-first century: a skeptical review", Cambridge Review of International Affairs (Vol. 22, No. 3; September 2009)

8.     Mely Caballero-Anthony. "Challenging Change: Nontraditional Security, Democracy, and Regionalism" in Donald K. Emmerson (ed.) Hard Choice: Security, Democracy, and Regionalism in Southeast Asia (Singapore: ISEAS, 2009)

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[1] www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2009/02/119967.htm

[2] Russia’s Search for Influence Southeast Asia

[3] Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia P.224

[4] ASEAN faces the future

[5]  Attitudes and Awareness toward ASEAN

[6] ASEAN faces the future

[7] ASEANin the twenty first century

[8] Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia P.258

[9] ASEAN faces the future

[10] Challenging Change: Nontraditional Security, Democracy, and Regionalism

[11] ASEAN in the twenty first century