Saturday, June 23, 2012

Reconciliation, Again failed


Afghanistan entered into the fourth consecutive decades of war - civil war or conflict. It was 28th of April 1978 when the PDPA (Communist People Democratic Party of Afghanistan) toppled president Mohammad Dawood Khan in a bloody coup d’état and installed pro-communist regime. Soon after the coup d’état, rural people returned against the PDPA and fled to Pakistan, where they started Jihad - Holy War - backed by Saudi Arabia, the United States, Pakistan and other anti-Soviet Union. In 1987, Najibullah, the last leader of PDPA in government, announced ‘National Reconciliation’, but failed to reconcile resistance’s leaders – Mujahidin.     

The steady resistance of Mujahidin forced the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan in February 1979 and the Najibullah government collapsed in April 1992. Civil war started among Jihadi leaders. Everyone claimed to have dominant role. Local people suffered a lot during civil war, till Taliban emerged in 1994 and fought against Jihadi leaders. Taliban captured more than 90% of Afghanistan while the rest almost 10% was controlled by Northern Alliance (NA) – front established against Taliban in north part of Afghanistan.

After 9/11 the so-called ‘war on terror’ or Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), NATO led by the United States attacked the Taliban on 7th of October 2001, after they denied to hand over Osama Bin Laden without concrete evidence[1]. NATO ousted the Taliban regime at the end of the same year. The United Nations along with Afghan multiple parties and ethnics delegations recalled the first Bonn conference in Germany to constitute a new Afghan government, but they invited neither the Taliban  nor the Hizb-i-Islami (Islamic Party – prominent party during the holy-war against Soviet Union led by Gulbadin Hikmatyar, who fought against both Taliban and NA 1990s.)

The Bonn conference and its agreement, as a milestone for Afghanistan, insists on ‘national reconciliation’ “promote national reconciliation, lasting peace, stability and respect for human rights in the country”[2]. But the Afghan government – Interim, transitional, and after the election – and international society largely marginalized the ‘national reconciliation’ and ‘National Commission for Peace in Afghanistan’ was established almost four years later.[3]
Here, in this paper, I will try to analyze some ‘possible’ reasons and obstacles that so far block or cause armed opponent of the government not to join so-called ‘National Reconciliation’, which here means a program supported and run by government under specific conditions to encourage their armed opponents – who fight against the government - to renounce armed-conflict or insurgency and join the government.
The first attempt of ‘national reconciliation’:
As soon as Mikhail Gorbachev was appointed as general secretary of the communist party of the Soviet Union in 1985, he understood the war is unwinnable and tried to finish the Soviet’s Afghanistan occupation. He reviewed Soviet Union war strategy of Afghanistan and replaced Babrak Karmal – who headed Afghanistan from December 1979 to May 1986 - by Najibullah, who declared National Reconciliation by the following year.[4] Najibullah recalled Loya Jirga (Great Council) where they ratified new constitution and Islam became the official state religion of Afghanistan. The Soviet Union tried to persuade Pakistan to sign non-interference agreement with Najibullah’s government, so then Soviet Union troop will withdraw from Afghanistan. Afghanistan and Pakistan signed the Geneva Accord (1988) on 14 April 1988 and USSR started withdrawing on the following month. Since the agreement was between Pakistan and Afghanistan, none of the Mujahidin (Seven plus two parties) paid attention.
Najibullah announced national reconciliation after eight years of the Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan. Resistance of the Mujahidin was at the highest peak, they were receiving enough money, weapon and ammunition from various countries through Pakistan, the only channel in Pakistan. Nevertheless, there were some Shia-Muslims Mujahidin, functioning in Iran and supported by Iran government. Before Najibullah, the Soviet Union and its 'puppet government' led by Babrak Karmal had fought for almost seven years against Mujahidin, who were in a critical situation at the beginning. USSR became weary of the ‘Afghan War’ and Mujahidin victory was inevitable while ‘National Reconciliation’ was declared. The more ones perceive themselves as a winner, the less they are keen to reconcile or compromise.
Besides that, the covert struggles for power for post-war era among Mujahidin leaders had already further complicated the situation, but there might have a chance for compromising.  Since almost all Mujahidin leaders and Afghan refugees were stationed in Pakistan and aids were channeled through ISI – Inter Service Intelligence – so, Pakistan had enough leverage over Mujahidin. Martin Ewarns (2005) clearly mentioned this point “The majority of the refugee might have preferred unity under the aegis of former king [Mohammad Zahir Shah, monarch, who was ousted in a bloodless coup d’état in 1973 by Mohammad Dawood Khan], poll conducted among Afghan refugees in July 1987, however the Pakistanis made sure ‘No royal representative’ was permitted to make contact with refugees.”[5] Nabi Misdaq (2006) goes step further in the leverage of Pakistan and writes “It was clear right from the beginning that Pakistan was not going to allow a united Afghan resistance front on its soil, because of its past experience of Afghan nationalism and the question of Pashtunistan.”[6]
Here we see the Soviet Union influence over Afghan government; they replace the head of state from on the one hand,  Pakistan’s influence over Mujahidin on the other hand. It is arguable that external factors played a vital rule in Afghan armed conflict during the first two decades.
September 11 and Bonn conference, the first:
After the dramatic collapse of the Taliban at the end of 2001, Northern Alliance rushed and entered Kabul. Most of the previous Mujahidin leaders, who had fled and left Kabul during Taliban regime, came back to Afghanistan. Lack of central authorities left whole Afghanistan in chaos. The United Nation appointed special representative, Lakhder Brahimi and recalled Bonn conference to bargain for power-share in Afghanistan. As mention above, they did not invite both Taliban and Islamic Party – who is now the second largest armed opponent of Afghan government after the Taliban.
Bonn conference was the first ‘structural obstacle’ for upcoming National Reconciliation. Later on, Lakhdar Brakhimi called the exclusion of Taliban in Bonn conference as an ‘original sin’.[7] Structural obstacle means, during the Bonn conference, NA would not compromise unless they obtain the key and high-rank posts except presidency in the government. Bonn conference, which was planned to reach agreement within one week, prolong to ten days, because of the incompatibilities among diverse Afghan parties and tribes. Pashtun tribe – which Taliban and Islamic party also belonged to – the majority in Afghanistan, was largely marginalized. Ministry of defense, Ministry of Interior and Ministry of foreign affairs were given to NA.[8] It was the first blockade for national reconciliation, where neither Northern Alliance will accept their previous foes, nor do the Taliban will try to join the government.
The Second attempt of National Reconciliation:
Soon after the collapse of the Taliban regime, it was a great chance for the government to invite and recall both Taliban and Islamic Party leaders to join the government or at least renounce insurgency. But the Afghan government did not. There are some possible reasons. A; They thought that the Taliban or Islamic Parity won’t be able or become strong to the extent that challenge the government and international society. B; International society still viewed the Taliban and Islamic Party as a terrorist network and threat for their national interest, and C;  because of the strong anti-Taliban and Islamic Party lobbies groups backed by NA inside interim and transitional government.
Anyway, after four years, when president Hamid Karzai won the ever first presidential election, he established National Commission for Peace (NCP) in Afghanistan and appointed Sibghatullah Mojadidi – ex-president – as a head. The CNP established their zonal and provincial offices. The head of provincial office in Khost province criticized the government for lack of fund and support, “The program failed, due to poor funding and a lack of political support, which meant that opportunities to bring in Taliban were squandered.”[9] Further more, Emilie Jelinek quoted a recently reconciled insurgent who says: “I regret joining this process; all of my brothers regret it as well, we have received no assistance from the government, nothing that they promised. We gave up everything in Miram Shah [the capital of Pakistan's North Waziristan agency, and a center of Taliban-affiliated groups] and now we have nothing, we can't get jobs. Our six families share a single room. Not even animals live the way we do now. We receive threatening calls from Miram Shah, that we will be found and killed and our home attacked."[10]
During Hamid Karzai presidential campaign for the second term, he promised that he would negotiate with Taliban and it will be the first priority. Karzai in his inaugural speech said “peace and national reconciliation [is] one of Afghanistan’s top priorities”[11]. He recalled Consultative Peace Jirga (council) to discuss whether and how the Afghan government should approach Taliban and other armed opponent of the government. More than 1600 tribal elders unanimously support Hamid Karzai move to negotiate with the Taliban and other armed opponents[12]. But there was intrastate confrontation to negotiate with the Taliban. Soon after the Consultative Peace Jirga, two high rank authorities, interior minister and head of national directorate of security (NDS) – Center intelligence department – resigned. Outwardly it is said they could not convince Hamid Karzai, that why they failed to prevent a suicide attacker and shelling of rocket over a great tent, where the peace consultative council was organized. But mostly it is believed that both interior minister and head of NDS were strongly against negotiation with the Taliban. Head of intelligence, Amrullah Saleh, is a leading figure of NA while, interior minister; Hanif Atmar was high rank and dominant person in PDPA.

Anyway, President Hamid Karzai established Peace Consultative Council (PCC) consist of 73 persons headed by ex-president Burhanddin Rabbani. This was a second institute to negotiate with the Taliban after NCP. It is believed that after selecting for the second term, Hamid Karzia felt more independent and tried to act a bit more independently. 

The Question why the Taliban did not want to join the so-called National Reconciliation may have deference dimensions and reasons. The first among all might be the Taliban so far did not recognize Hamid Karzai's government as a legitimate government. In Afghanistan case, history shows that ‘the winner’ does not compromise. Since United States already announced the ‘exit strategy’ where NATO will end their mission by the end of 2014, so the Taliban may see this deadline as a milestone for their re-emerging.

On the other hand, US and their alliance became weary in 11 years long war. The economic crisis in 2008 further turns local people in NATO member’s countries against the so-called unwinnable war. The United States has softened their stance against Taliban. After they killed Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan Joe Biden, the vice president of the United States told: “Taliban per se is not our enemy.”[13]  In Early January 2012, it was a breakthrough for negotiation when the Taliban, for the first time since their regime was toppled, announced that they agreed to open diplomatic office in Qatar and lead negations[14], but two months later they suspended their negotiation and blamed US for not meeting what they had promised. As 2014 is approaching, William Maley mentioned that the United States “simply an effort to save face before withdrawal”.[15] The answer for the question, whether Taliban’s negotiation with United States in absence of Afghan government will solve the problem, or is it the original reconciliation, is more blurred and vague.

Explicit dominance of anti – Taliban or ex- foes of the Taliban, who are blamed for killing thousands surrendered Taliban at the end of 2001[16] in the government might be another reason for the Taliban not to join the reconciliation process. If the Taliban join the government, how they should be called, still a terrorist, liberator – who fought against United States or so-called invader, and how their sacrifices or prices should be viewed – traitors or martyr, this is another completed issue. The designation of Burhanuddin Rabbani as a head of Consultative Peace Council, who was the prominent warlord and leader of NA might be another possible reason too. Bbecause Taliban may have still seen him as an ex-foe rather than peace envoy. It is noteworthy to mention that Burhanuddin Rabbani was assassinated in September 2011 and Hamid Karzai appointed his son Salahuddin Rabbani on the same post. The reason why Hamid Karzai is very stick to appoint member of the NA for PCC might be he somehow wants the NA to be the part of national reconciliation, so the other members of the NA may not openly renounce or come against reconciliation process, but it is unknown, how much the higher price Karzai pays to keep the Northern Alliance on the track.
Neighbors and Regional players:
Key player among the regional and neighbors is Pakistan. So far Pakistan is being blamed for not cooperating in peace and reconciliation. Afghan government nowadays blames Pakistan for sabotaging the peace and reconciliation process. Ahmed Rashid (2012) quoted Hamid Karzai after he met with Pakistan authorities “[I bluntly told the Pakistanis that you are] sabotaging and undermining my efforts to talk to the Taliban.”[17] The concern of the Afghan government erupted when ISI arrested Mullah Barader, deputy of Mullah Mohammad Omer – the spiritual leader in command of current Taliban and ex-head of Taliban regime in Kabul – who, the Afghan government thinks, was willing to negotiate  with the government and saw a peaceful solution for the armed conflict in Afghanistan[18]. The Afghan government repeatedly demands Pakistan to hand Barader over, but he is still in Pakistan prison. Agha Jan Mutasim, head of political affair of the Taliban, is another pro-reconciliation and peace talks. He came under attack and injured in Quetta of Pakistan, then moved to Turkey, outwardly for his treatment. But most Afghans see it was a second attempt of ISI to target pro-reconciliation among the Taliban.
The Relation between Pakistan and Afghanistan more strained when the head of Peace Consultative Council, Burhanuddin Rabbani, was assassinated in Kabul September 2011. Again Afghan intelligence NDS blamed ISI for planning and carrying out that attack, but Pakistan, as always, rejected these blames. The root causes of reluctance of Pakistan might be the growing influence of India, as Milton A Bearden, former Central Intelligence Agency station chief in Islamabad, mentioned “India is becoming involved in Afghanistan to an extent that the Pakistanis consider Afghanistan as developing into an Indian garrison. This is not hysteria. This is a real concern. Pakistan has fought three very real wars [against India].”[19] The Afghan government signed strategic partnership agreement with India where India will equip and train the Afghan National Army (ANA) along with support and cooperation in many other fields. India has established two consulates on Afghan and Pakistan bordering provinces, Jalalabad and Kandahar, where Pakistan blamed India for supporting of the Baluch separatist in Pakistan.
Iran is another key player. Mostly United States and NATO blame Iran for supporting of Taliban, although Iran and Taliban had a rivalry relations during the Taliban regime. Iran’s great concern is US existence in Afghanistan. Afghanistan and United States signed a strategic partnership agreement (SPA), according to which, the US will stay and support Afghanistan till 2024. Iran bluntly criticized this SPA and tried to encourage Afghan MPs to veto it[20]. In a recent blow to peace and reconciliation happened when ‘Dadullah Front’ – Taliban affiliated allied – assassinated a senior member of peace council, Arsala Rahmani, Iran was blamed for giving mute-sniper gun to ‘Dadullah Front’.
Conclusion:
Afghanistan does not have a good background of compromising. During the history ‘the winner’ always tried to ‘take all’. In 1980s first the government did want to compromise and later Mujahidin saw their inevitable victory, so they did ignore the so-called National Reconciliation offer of Najibullah, but the neighbor and great power – Pakistan, Saudi and US- did play a deceive role.
The same happened in post 9/11 too. Both the international community and the Afghan government marginalized the reluctant Taliban at the very beginning, now the Taliban take a hard stance, which seem further complicated to compromise. Karzai alone did somehow to encourage the Taliban, but there is widespread confrontation both inside government and people particularly in the northern part of Afghanistan. They still believe that Taliban and their affiliated parties should be eliminated through war, which seems far away from reality.
Reconciliation attempts, taken by Afghan government so far, viewed mostly by those who are still fighting against the Afghan government, more symbolic actions. The high rank officials of Taliban, who reconciled with peace process, don’t feel secured. Abuld Salam Zayeef, Taliban ambassador to Pakistan in 1990s, fled to United Arabic Emirate. He openly wrote in his memo that he has received more threat of death, both from the International society and intra-state (Afghan) authorities.
Neighboring countries also tried to use Afghan against each other. The Afghan government so far failed to convince them that cooperation with Afghan government from any country will not endanger national interest of any countries. 




[2] Bonn Agreement on Provisional Arrangements:
 http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/Documents/Bonn-agreement.pdf
[3]Sibghatullah Mojadidi, Head of the commission; http://www.afghan-web.com/bios/today/mojaddedi.html
[4] Vogelsang, Willem, The Afghans, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002
[5] Ewans, Martin; Conflict in Afghanistan, Routledge, 2005 P-136.
[6] Misdaq, Dr. Nabi; Afghanistan Routledge, 2006, P-158.
[7] Field, Mark and Ramsha, Ahmed, A review of the 2001 Bonn conference and application to the road ahead of Afghanistan, INSS Strategic Perspective 8
[8] Annex IV Composition of the interim administration, Bonn agreement http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/Documents/Bonn-agreement.pdf
[10] Ibid

[11] Johnson, E. Mark, Reintegration and reconciliation in Afghanistan, Military Review, November-December 2010.
[13] Jha, K. Lalit, US says Taliban is not enemy, Pajhwok News Agency.
[15] Maley, William, Afghanistan in 2010, Asian Survey. 
[16] Barry, John and Dehghanpisheh, Babak, The death convoy of Afghanistan, Newsweek, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/09/AR2010040904807.html
[17] Rashid, Ahmed, Pakistan on the brink, P-131.
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